The Structure of Scientific Recommendations
Scientific recommendations are surrounded by heated disputes. Some think that scientists who issue recommendations are trespassing beyond their proper factual domain into a domain of non-cognitive values where the only legitimate recommendation is “think for yourself.” Others regard value-laden scientific recommendations as entirely legitimate and argue that the lay public and policy-makers have a civic duty to “follow the science.” On the basis of criticism of these extremes, I consider the structure of scientific recommendations and argue that there are two distinct structural requirements on providing scientific recommendations. One that pertains to value-alignment with those affected by the recommendation as well as an epistemic requirement. Given that much research has been devoted to value-alignment, I set out to articulate the epistemic requirement in the form of an epistemic norm of scientific recommendations. It turns out, however, that this epistemic norm I set forth has important ramifications for the substructure of scientific recommendations. By reflecting on this substructure, I develop some further guidelines for providing scientific recommendations. I conclude by briefly considering how the norms and guidelines of scientific recommendations are affected in times of crisis.
12:00-13:15, Palazzo Nuovo, Aula di Antica
Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition