S&M talk: Caterina Sisti

Subjectivist interpretations of probability identify probabilities with degrees of belief, raising the question of how the notion of objective chance – and the apparently objective role of probability in science – can arise within such a framework. Ramsey discussed chances, while de Finetti rejected objective probabilities, a contrast that has often been taken to show that de Finetti’s subjectivism is far more radical than Ramsey’s. I argue that this opposition is overstated. By comparing Ramsey’s account of chance with de Finetti’s reflections on risk and uncertainty, I suggest that both rely on a similar idea: objectivity can emerge through agreement and convergence among agents. Interpreting Ramsey’s chances as intersubjective probabilities helps reconcile his view with de Finetti’s subjectivism and highlights a shared pragmatist strand in early subjectivist thought. (based on j.w.w. Luca Zanetti)
 

12:00--13:15, Palazzo Nuovo, Philosophy Library, Meeting Room 1