LLC Seminar: Filippo Ferrari

Beall and Restall (2006) have offered an influential and controversial characterisation of logical pluralism (LP) as the thesis that our pre-theoretic notion of validity is indeterminate and admits multiple admissible precisifications, singling out different correct logics (e.g., classical, constructive, relevant). In this paper we critically assess the so-called “Collapse Problem” originally discussed in Priest (2006) and argue that it fails to establish its conclusion that LP collapses into monism. To this end, we first argue that the collapse problem comprises two distinct arguments: one from truth-preservation and one from normativity. We then consider each argument in turn and argue that both rely on a problematic understanding of some of the core tenets of LP. Accordingly, we conclude that neither of these arguments effectively undermines LP.

https://www.llc-philosophy.unito.it/events/llc-seminars#h.ytrxnr11ncue

Palazzetto Gorresio, Aula 7